VIRDEN ET AL. vs. THE BRIG CAROLINE.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the Urnited States, for the -District of
-Delaware-OctoberTerm, A. .D. 1857.
HENRY VIRDEN ET AL. VS. THE BRIG CAROLINE.
1. Where a steam tug is kept constantly employed during the winter, on a dangerous station, and at a heavy expense, for the express purpose of rendering salvage
and towage service to vessels in distress, her owners are entitled to the fall
remuneration usually awarded to salvors who peril life and property, though the
particular salvage service may not have been actually accompanied by much
danger or labor.
2. A brig was caught and damaged in the ice in Delaware bay, and, from the
nature of bar injuries, could only be rescued by the removal of her forward cargo.
This was done (and it was not otherwise possible) by and with the assistance of
a steam tug stationed at the Breakwater. Part of the cargo thus removed was
transhipped to the tug, and the brig afterwards towed by her into port. The
court decreed to the owners of the tug, one-half the value of the cargo transhipped, and four per cent. of that of the vessel and remaining cargo.

This was a libel for salvage, by the owners of the steam tug America, and came up on an appeal from the decree of the District
Court, awarding the sum of $650 to the libellants for salvage services to the brig Caroline and cargo, and from which decree the
libellants appealed, upon the ground of inadequate remuneration.
The vessel salved was lying at the Breakwater, at the mouth of
the Delaware bay, on the flrst day of February, A. D. 1857, and
upon that day the services were performed. The day following, the
steam tug was obliged to go to New York for fuel, and upon her
return, a few days afterwards, completed the salvage by towing the
brig to New Castle.
The vessel and cargo were valued at about twenty-one thousand
dollars. The case was argued in the Circuit Court by
Rodney and Bayard, for the libellants, and
Bradford, for the claimants.

VIRDEN ET AL. vs. THE BRIG CAROLINE.

The facts of the case are fully disclosed in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
TANEY, C. J.-This is a claim for salvage, and the testimony in
the case clearly establishes that the brig was in great peril, and was
rescued from danger by the libellants.
The only question open to dispute, is the amount of compensation
to which the salvors are entitled. And this is one of those questions
in which it is often so difficult to come to a satisfactory conclusion,
and upon which different minds will often form different judgments.
There is no rule of law, nor any fixed rule of judicial discretion,
by which the compensation can be exactly measured.
The principle is, that the salvor is entitled to an adequate reward,
according to the circumstances of the case. But the material circumstances in every case will be found, in some respects, peculiar
to itself, and to differ from all others. The peril in which the property is placed, its character and value, the danger and labors of
the salvors, their expenses and skill, and sacrifices of time or money
necessarily made, are all to be considered, and in no two cases are,
perhaps, precisely the same. The sum allowed in one case can,
therefore, furnish no precedent for a like allowance in another.
And we can gather nothing more upon this questioh, from the
reported cases, than the general policy by which courts of admiralty have been governed, and that policy undoubtedly is to deal
liberally with salvors, in order to encourage exertions and sacrifices
to rescue life or property from the dangers to which it must always
be liable in maritime pursuits.
In the case before the court, the brig was evidently in imminent
peril, and required immediate aid. She was at the Breakwater, in
the Delaware bay, on the 1st of February last, exposed to the heavy
floating ice with which the river was then filled. Her starboard
bow or lumber port had been stove in, at the latter end of the ebb
tide, by the heavy ice that came down the river, and it was absolutely necessary, for the safety of the vessel, that it should be
repaired and strengthened before the next ebb tide; for the pilot
on board of her, (who is a witness called by the claimants,) states
that, if it had not been so repaired, the ice would probably have

VIRDEN ET AL. vs. THE BRIG CAROLINE.

struck her bow port again on the next ebb tide, and sunk the vessel. The injuries it had already received made it incapable of
resisting the blows and pressure of the heavy bodies of ice which
came rapidly down the river when the tide was ebbing. The larger
part of the injured port was under water, and the vessel was leaking from the injury, but not so badly as to cause any apprehension
of immediate danger on that account. She was easily kept free by
a single pump. But in order to repair the damage, and protect the
vessel from the ice, it was necessary to raise her bow high enough
to bring the whole port above water, and this could not be done
without discharging a large part of her forward cargo.
As soon as the pilot in charge of the brig discovered the danger,
he applied to a schooner anchored near him to come alongside, and
take off so much of the cargo as it was necessary to remove. But
the master of the schooner declined complying with the request,
saying that his own vessel was leaking, and he had but one anchor.
And, upon receiving this answer, he immediately hoisted a signal
of distress; and the steam tug came to his assistance. She was
alongside of the brig as soon as she could make her way though the
floating ice; and upon learning from the pilot the situation of the
brig, the captain of the steam tug immediately placed ten hands on
board to assist in lightening her by discharging her forward cargo.
Her deck load forward, consisting of heavy hogsheads, weighing
1600 or 1700 pounds, and imbedded in ice on the deck, and on that
account requiring great force to move them, were thrown overboard.
Coffee and other merchandise were taken from the hold and placed
on board of the steam tug; and portions of the forward cargo
moved aft. By these means, the bows of the brig were in two or
three hours raised so high that the whole of the port was out of
water, and was then repaired and made safe under the direction of
the pilot-the steam tug laying by, at his request, until the work
was completed, and the port made safe; and as soon as the river
was in a condition to make it safe to do so, the brig was towed by
the steam tug to New Castle in safety; and the portion of the cargo
taken on board the steam tug at the Breakwater, and which had
remained on board, was delivered to the agent of the claimants.
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So far, then, as concerns the property saved, it was a case of imminent peril, in which a total loss of vessel and cargo would probably
have occurred, with danger of life, but for the prompt assistance of
the steamboat. And, judging from the whole evidence, the court
is not satisfied that any part of the property rescued from danger
would or could have been saved in any other way. It is true, the
pilot of the brig says that, if he had received no assistance from any
quarter, he could have saved the vessel and residue of the cargo, by
throwing overboard, with his own crew, the deck load which was
thrown over after the arrival of the steamboat, and also the goods
and merchandise which were transferred to the steamboat; and that
he would have done this with his own crew and boat, and then
repaired the damaged port. But the weight of the testimony is
adverse to the opinion of the pilot.
It evidently was essential to the safety of the vessel that the
heavy hogsheads on the forward part of the deck, which contributed
so much to press the bows of the vessel down in the water, should
be removed.
Her head would not rise so as to reach the injured part until this
was done. And it appears from the testimony, that those heavy
hogsheads were so firmly fastened to the deck by the ice, that there
was great difficulty in moving them, when ten men from the steam
tug were added to the crew of the brig, and all were united in the
effort.
The first attempt, even with all this force, failed, and they were
obliged to resort to a different tackle from the one first tried, before
the object could be accomplished.
No attempt had been made to move them, until the additional
force from the steamboat was on board; and the court is satisfied
from an attentive consideration of the whole testimony, that if the
attempt had been made by the crew of the brig, without any other
aid, it must have failed. The captain had left her five days before
the disaster happened. There was no one on board but the pilot,
mate, three seamen, and the cook; anl if with this comparatively
weak force they had attempted, by sawing down the bulwarks, to
put these heavy hogsheads overboard, the attempt would most
15
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probably have resulted in serious injury to the vessel, or to the
persons engaged in the work.
It is possible, and barely possible, that hands might have been
sent in boats from the other vessels if there had been no steamboat
to assist her. But if this had been done, it must have been done
obviously at great risk of life and property.
There were thirty-seven vessels in sight. They were all more or
less in danger from the ice when the tide was running, and no one
could foresee at what moment the danger would come upon them.
During the brief period of slack water, between the tides, there
were occasionally times when boats from some of the vessels might
safely come to the brig. But no one could foresee how soon the
floating ice might prevent their return, or render it exceedingly
hazardous. Besides, every vessel was necessarily constantly on its
guard, and might at any moment need the presence of its whole
crew to save itself, and the pilot of the brig himself states the difficulties and dangers which would have attended relief in this mode
from other vessels, and says that "Every crew ought to be at home
when the ice is running." The relief, therefore, if given by boats
from other vessels, would have been at the hazard of the lives of
those employed, and increased the risk of the vessels to which they
belonged. No such relief was offered, nor is a single witness produced from any other vessel who says it could or would have been
given.
And the captain of the Powhattan, who came on board after he
saw the steam tug alongside, thought it prudent to engage the
steam tug to take him back to his vessel, in case the floating ice
should block up his return, or render it hazardous to his boat.
It is manifest, therefore, that if relief had come from boats dispatched from other vessels, the relief would have been afforded at
such risk of life and property as would entitle the salvors to the
most favorable consideration of the court in awarding them compensation.
And even with all this hazard and risk, the property transferred
to the steam tug must have been thrown overboard and utterly
lost. For it was clearly impossible for any other vessel to have
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gone alongside of the brig. This fact is positively stated by the
engineer of the steamboat, and he is fully confirmed by every witness examined from other vessels which were lying around her, and
witnessed the whole scene.
It took the steam tug, with all her advantages, one hour to reach
her, although the distance was only about five hundred yards, and
she was occasionally obliged to back from the weight and pressure
of the ice in her way.
It is urged, however, by the claimants, that the steamboat encountered no danger, and consumed but little time in rescuing the
brig and cargo from the peril in which it was placed. This is true.
But it must be remembered that the steam tug had by the prudent
foresight of her owners, and at a heavy expense, been prepared to
render such services promptly and without much danger to herself
or her crew. She was strongly built, well manned, and placed at
the breakwater in the Delaware, where it was well known many
vessels must be detained at this inclement season, and would be
constantly in danger from the winds and the ice. She was kept
there at a heavy daily expense, and with her crew constantly exposed to severe weather, but yet always in readiness to go to the
aid of a vessel in distress. It is the well-established policy of'
courts of admiralty to remunerate liberally salvors who risk lif&
and property, or suffer hardships in rescuing a vessel or cargo wlen.
in danger of perishing. And I cannot perceive any reason why-&
salvor should be entitled to less, who expends his money in preparing a vessel by which the service can be rendered with less ris'k
and keeps her at the place where danger is anticipated, at a heavy
daily expense, in order that assistance. may be promptly rendered
when the emergendy shall arise.
The reason assigned for a liberal allowance in the one case,
applies with equal force in the other. And, in my judgment, the
salvors are entitled to the same measure of compensation that the
court would have deemed just, if the vessel had been rescued by- the
boats of the surrounding ships, amid the hazards which such an
enterprise on their part would evidently have brought with it. The
situation of the America in this case was unlike that of a steamboat
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her way for a short distance, and delays her voyage for a few hours,
in order to afford the necessary relief. Her sacrifice of time and
labor would be small. But here was a daily heavy expense, and she
was always prepared, at the point of danger when assistance was
needed.
Entertaining these views of the case, I think the sum awarded by
the District Court is not an adequate compensation for the service
rendered. I am aware, as I said before, that upon this question
there is no certain and definite rule to guide the court, and different
minds will unavoidably come to different conclusions.
It is, therefore, the practice of appellate courts, where its opinion
:approximates to the one entertained by the court below, not to disturb its judgment, although it may not fully concur in the propriety
,of the sum awarded.
But where it is otherwise, it is undoubtedly the duty of the appellate tribunal to decide the case upon its own judgment as to the
rights and just claims of the parties. (19 How. 160.)
And dealing with the case according to the conclusions of fact
-which I have herein before stated, and the principles which admiralty courts have been accustomed to apply to such cases, I think
that, for the portion of the cargo which was transferred to the
steamboat, the salvors are entitled justly to one-half its value.
This portion was destined to certain destruction, if the steam-tug
had not been there, and come to the relief of the brig. For if she
could have been saved by her own crew, or by boats from other
ships, this part of her cargo must have been thrown overboard to
lighten her near the bows, and it was evidently impracticable for
.any other vessel but a steamboat to come alongside and take it off.
In cases of derelict, where there has been any hazard in saving
it, the one-half has been most commonly allowed. And in this
case the property could not by any possibility have been saved
if this steam-tug had not been placed at the breakwater, and
kept there at the expense of the owners, ready to interpose the
moment the brig hung out the signal of distress. It presents at
least as strong a case for compensation as that of a vessel found
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accidentally passing at the time of the disaster, which turns out of
abandoned at sea, for without the aid of the steam-tug the loss was
not merely highly probable, but absolutely certain and inevitable.
As relates to the vessel and the rest of the cargo, I feel more
difficulty in coming to a conclusion. They were undoubtedly saved
by the steam-tug, and upon the principles already stated she is
entitled to as high a rate of compensation as would have been
allowed to the boats of the other ships. And taking all the circumstances into consideration, and the towage of the vessel afterwards
to a port of safety, it appears to me that about four per cent. of the
value saved would not be more than a fair and adequate compensation. I do not mean to rest this part of the opinion upon any rule
of percentage applicable to cases of this kind. I look rather at the
sum which that percentage will produce, and compare it with the
value of the services rendered. Nor shall I enter into any nice calculations as to the precise amount which these allowances will
produce.
The judgment is necessarily founded upon estimates, and there
can be no exact mathematical calculation fixing precisely the first
amount. But looking to the whole case in all its circumstances, as
it appears on the record, I am of opinion that the libellants are
justly entitled to seventeen hundred dollars ($1700) as a compensation for the salvage services rendered to the brig, and shall decree
accordingly.

In the -District Court of the United States, for South Carolina,
October, 1857.
I'CREADY, MOTTE & CO. vs. R. L. & W. E. HOLMES.

Though a carrier, in the absence of evidence of fraud or mistake, is concluded
by the receipt in his bill of lading, as to the quantity or amount of the goods
shipped; yet, in an action for the freight, where the consignee has received the
goods at the wharf, without qualification or reservation of the right to inspect,
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weigh, or measure them, and the carrier proves due care of them during the
transit, and an actual delivery of all in his possession on his arrival, the burthen
of proof is on the consignee to establish that a deficiency in the quantity specified
in the bill of lading, afterwards discovered, is chargeable to the wrongful act or
neglect of the carrier.

Libel in admiralty, in personam.
The facts of the case will appear in the opinion of the court.
Bdward McCready, Esq., for libellants.
0. Hf. Simonton, Esq., for respondents.
McGRATH, J.-The libel in this case, is filed to recover a balance
of freight, for the transportation of one hundred tons of coal from
Philadelphia to Charleston. The vessel arrived at Charleston, and
the coal was delivered to the respondents, the consignees: who with
their carts carried it to the office of the public weigher ; and by his
weight, it appeared there was a deficiency of several tons. The
respondents claim a deduction from the freight, of so much as is
alleged to be the value of the coal which has been lost. It is conceded that a certain percentage (21) of loss, is usually allowed.
The libellants concede this allowance, and charge freight for 971,
tons; but insist that no other deduction should be made. The cartmen employed by the respondents depose that they carted to the
public weigher all the coal they received: and the libellants prove
that all the coal received in Philadelphia was brought to Charleston,
and delivered to the respondents.
A carrier is responsible to the consignee for the safe delivery of
property committed to his care. Ordinarily, the bill of lading
determines the nature of his liability. When by the execution of
that paper he has admitted his possession of the property of another,
it is conclusive against him, unless upon proof of inadvertence,
mistake, or deceit. That the carrier did not supervise the process
by which the weight was ascertained ; or that he signed a bill of
lading upon a representation which he did not verify, are suggestions
to which I would reluctantly listen, if offered to qualify a liability
plainly expressed in the bill of lading. No sufficient reason in this
case is presented to me for doubting the correctness of the weight
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as ascertained in Philadelphia, and I hold the libellants concluded
by it.
The libellants being thus liable for the safe delivery of the property subject to such exceptions, as by custom or contract qualify
that liability, can discharge themselves by showing a performance
of their undertaking. This they do, by proof that all the coal
received at Philadelphia was duly cared for while being laden; that
all precautions were taken to secure it from loss by theft or otherwise; and that all the coal in the vessel was delivered to the
respondents.
The undertaking of a carrier is affected by the nature of the
property he may have in his custody. If its value is determined
by measure, weight, or any other test, his liability depends upon
the result of an application of that test, at the port of delivery,
under such circumstances as I shall notice. But the consignee may
not require the test. He may be satisfied, and willing to receive
his consignment without the delay, trouble, and expense of ascertaining whether it corresponds with fractional accuracy to that
specified in the bill of lading. A delivery and acceptance of this
kind would not conclude the consignee in case of loss or damage
subsequently ascertained; but it would increase the difficulty of
making a carrier liable for loss or damage, (as in this case by a
diminution in quantity) ascertained after the carrier had parted with
his possession ; and by an examination made without his knowledge
or presence. And if it should be, that after the carrier had parted
with his possession of the property, it has been in the possession
and control of other agents of the consignee; the reason for
exonerating the carrier increases in proportion to the number of
such agents, the length of time for which they were in possession;
and the opportunities they enjoyed to diminish the quantity for
which the carrier was liable.
In this case, the carrier received one hundred tons of coal, and
became bound for its delivery. That delivery must be so made as
to admit an ascertainment by the consignee, of the fidelity with
which the contract of the carrier has been performed. It is not
the duty of the carrier to weigh, measure, or inspect property,
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before he delivers it to the consignee; but it is a right in theoconsignee to ascertain whether the quantity or quality of the property,
which the carrier has had in his charge, has been lessened or
impaired, while it was in the possession of the carrier, and by
causes for which he is liable. The consignee may therefore qualify
his acceptance, by notice to the carrier that he intends to weigh,
measure, or by any other appropriate test, ascertain if what he has
received, is that which the carrier admitted that he had received,
and agreed to deliver. And such notice would bind the carrier so
that he would be concluded by the examination made in pursuance
of it, unless he was able to show its insufficiency. If upon that
examination, it appeared that there was a deficieney in quantity or
diminution in value, which would have justified the consignee in refusing to receive the property, if known to him before he had
received it, he still would have that right. And if the carrier
acquiesced in the examination, he would have a right to supervise
the transportation to the place of, and to be present at the examination; and there to enforce his lien as perfectly as he could have
done, while the property was in the hold of his vessel. In such a
case, the delivery on the one side, and the acceptance on the other,
would be qualified, operating as a special agreement, under which
the lien of the carrier may be preserved, and all the rights of both
parties secured. No wrongful act of the consignee or owner can divest
the lien of the carrier. (Mont. 40; 3 McCord R. 120.) In England,
if the goods are not to be landed at a particular wharf, the carrier may
send them to a public wharf, and the possession of the wharfinger will
support the lien of the carrier. Indeed, the corresponding rights of
the carrier to his freight, secured by a lien on the cargo, and of the
consignee to an inspection or examination of the property, have been
understood and provided for, even in the earliest times. The Laws
of Wisbuy, the Ordinance of Rotterdam, the Consolato del Mare,
with some variations in the details, but an uniform recognition of
the principle, make it the duty of the master not to detain the
goods in the vessel, where they cannot be inspected, but to have
them in some place where they may be examined. In England, it
is said to be the practice, in cases where goods should be landed
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and warehoused, that the master may secure his lien by entering
them in his own name. And the Dock Act of 39 Geo. 3, ch. 69,
and 45 Geo. 3, ch. 58, expressly reserve the lien of the master.
(Chitty on Carriers, 312, and note.) It may not be uninstructive,
at least in this court, that we should bear in mind that here, the
lien of the carrier is not only referred to the common law, by the
strict rule of which, possession must accompany the lien; but it is
also, that hypothecation implied in maritime contracts, and to the
enforcement of which possession is not essential.
As the carrier has no right which is affected by the right of the
consignee to this examination or inspection, of course he cannot
refuse the consignee the full benefit of it. He has no right to insist
that the consignee shall receive his property in any manner by
which his claim for loss or damage may be made more difficult or
embarrassing. He cannot enforce a delivery of property at improper times, or in bad weather, if the property cannot be secured by
the consignee, or is exposed to damage during its transfer to the
store. The consignee is entitled to reasonable notice, if he is known,
of the arrival of the property, and to a fair opportunity of providing suitable means to carry it away safely. Story Bail. sec. 509;
Olcott's Rep. 47. But the consignee has not the right to accept
a delivery of the goods, commit them to his agents, examine them
without notice to the carrier, and charge the carrier with a loss
alleged to have been thus subsequently ascertained, upon such proof
as excludes all reasonable probability of the loss having happened
except in the hands of the carrier.
By the French law, upon a delivery to the consignee, he must
give a discharge to the carrier.
2 Boul. Paty, 318.
If he
refuses to receive the goods, or receives them and refuses to give a
discharge, he renders himself liable in damages. If his refusal to
receive the goods is upon the ground of damage, or other sufficient
reason, by his application to the proper officer, qualified persons are
named, who determine the sufficiency of the cause alleged for the
refusal to receive. Code de Commerce, Art. 106; 2 Boul. Paty,
318. The depot and the transportation of the property are also
ordered, and a sale, if necessary, to the amount of the freight due
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to the carrier. The right of the consignee to an examination before
he accepts the property, is necessary, because acceptance and payment of freight extinguish all claim against the carrier. Code de
Commerce, Art. 105.
I have considered this question without reference to such modifications of the general principle as arise from general custom, local
usage, or special contract. They afford the rule in all cases in
which they occur. I have not any evidence of either of these existing here, and the rule, as I have stated it, is the general law, unaffected by such qualifications as exist in certain places or in certain
cases.
Supposing, then, that the quantity of coal was correctly ascertained at Philadelphia, there is a deficiency as it is now in the hands
of the consignee. But the evidence shows that the loss cannot be
attributed to want of care, theft, or any other cause operating while
in the vessel to diminish the quantity. There was some evidence of
loss happening by the transfer of coal from the vessel to the wharf,
but it was too indefinite to be the basis of any conclusion; nor,
indeed, was it made to bear directly upon this case. It rather
seemed to furnish the explanation of the usual allowance of 21 per
cent. loss.
But the loss may have happened after the delivery to the consignee. The coal was carted, after it was landed, to some distance,
and then weighed. The carts were under the control of the agents
of the consignee. It is quite as reasonable to infer that the loss
happened while the coal was under the care of the agents of the
consignee, as while it was under the charge of the carrier. If the
consignee had notified the carrier of his intention to have the coal
weighed by a public weigher, it would have been proper in the carrier, affected as he would have been by all that was done under such
a notice, to watch the transportation of the coal, and to be present
when it was weighed. But, without such notice, the carrier had no
reason to suppose that the coal was to be re-weighed to decide his
liability, particularly when, according to the evidence of the public
weigher, there is no uniformity in the practice, and that coal is often
received by the consignees without this test.
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The postponement of the ascertainment of the liability of the
carrier, without prejudice to the consignee; and the preservation
also of the rights of the carrier, are embraced in the rule that, "if
a person is apprehensive of losing a right by any event, it may be
advisable and necessary for him to protect himself, either by protesting against a prejudicial interpretation of the event, or by
reserving his rights." (Lindley's Jurisp. 142.) And although not
strictly analogous, yet the principle which by the custom of London
applies to the vessel at quarantine, illustrates the preservation of
the mutual rights of the carrier and consignee, although the carrier
has parted with the property, and it is in the possession of the
consignee. In the case of a vessel at quarantine at London, the
consignee, at his own expense and risk, sends for the goods; and
the packing and care of the goods in the transit to the wharf devolve
upon the consignee. (Chitty on Carriers, 265.) The delivery does
not determine the liability of the carrier altogether, nor will it
divest his lien. But in the transportation from the only place
where a delivery can be made, to the place in which an examination
can be had, the risk of loss or damage is with the consignee. So
in this case, the carrier has landed the coal; and at the wharf, made
delivery of it to the consignee. The consignee intending to cart it
elsewhere, and to weigh it, must do so at his own expense and risk.
If loss or damage occurs in that transportation, the consignee must
bear it.
I have sufficiently expressed the opinion, that although the mere
transit was ended by delivery at the wharf, yet that acceptance
there did not necessarily extinguish the liability of the carrier. The
delivery must be such as enables the cpnsignee to ascertain, if he
desires, how far the contract of the carrier has been performed; it
must be such as allows the consignee safely to receive and properly
to examine what has been delivered. If the consignee, without
notice or qualifying his acceptance, receives, as in this case, coal;
commits it to his agents, in whose charge it may be lost, as well at
least as while it was in the charge of the carrier; and rests the
proof of loss by the carrier upon evidence which does not render it
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more probable that the loss was chargeable to the carrier, than to
his own agents; a case is presented in which I am not at liberty to
make the carrier liable.
The decree will be entered in favor of the libellants for the freight
unpaid, and the costs.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
JACOB BORN ET AL. vs. LUCAS SHAW.

A sale of horses was made in the State of Virginia, within the jurisdiction of which
both the parties and the property were at the time, but possession was retained
by the vendor. The horses were subsequently sent into the State of Pennsylvania
to be pastured, and there made the subject of an attachment by creditors of the
vendor. It was held that the validity of the sale, and of the title of the vendee,
was to be determined by the law of Virginia, so far as it differs from that of Pennsylvania on the subject of fraud in the sale of chattels.

Error to the Common Pleas of Green county.
T.-By the law of Pennsylvania a sale of personal property is not good, as against the creditors of the vendor, unless
possession be delivered to the vendee in accordance with the sale.
Where possession is retained by the vendor, it is not only evidence
of fraud, but fraud per se. There are some exceptional cases.
Where, from the nature of the transaction, possession either could
not be delivered at all, or, at least, without defeating fair and
honest objects intended to be effected by, and constituting the
motive for entering into the contract, the case might be regarded as
an exception to the rule. Yet where possession has been withheld
from the vendee pursuant to tle terms of the argument, some good
reason for the arrangement, beyond the convenience of the parties,
should appear. Glow et al. vs. Woods, 5 S. & R., 273.
But this rule does not appear to prevail in Virginia. Davis vs.
Turner, 4 Grattan, 422.
. In that State the rule is, that retention of possession of personal
property by the vendors, after an absolute sale, is primafacie fraudulent, but the presumption may be rebutted by proof.
In this case the parties to the sale, and the property which was
LEwIs, 0.
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the subject of it, were within the jurisdiction of Virginia when the
sale was made, but the property, consisting of horses and mules,
was subsequently sent over the State line into Pennsylvania to be
pastured, and the question is whether, on an attachment in Pennsylvania by a creditor of the vendor, the validity of the sale shall
be tested by the law of Virginia, or by that of Pennsylvania?
If there had been previous sale by the owners at their place of
domicil, and the contest was between the prior and subsequent purchasers, a very different question would be presented: so if the property had been situated within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania at
the time of the sale in Virginia, the lex r'ei sitce might be applied for
the purpose of protecting the rights of our own citizens.
But where the property and the parties to the sale were within
the jurisdiction of another State, when the contract was made and
executed according to the laws of that State, the' right vested eo
instanti in the purchaser, and no subsequent removal of the property into Pennsylvania, for a lawful purpose, can divest it.
The subsequent removal of the horses and mules, for the purpose
of pasturing them in Pennsylvania, was no violation of our policy,
nor of the rights of our citizens. They had no claims upon it under
our laws when the sale was made, because it was not in any respect
subject to our jurisdiction.
Their claims upon it were under the laws of Virginia, and the
court fell into error in holding that the validity of the sale was to
be tested by the law of Pennsylvania. Jienret vs. Jackson, 7 Martin, 318 ; Scott vs. Duffy, 2 Harris, 18 ; Shelby vs. Guy,11 Wheaton, 361.
By the common law, a debtor has a xight to prefer one class of
creditors to another, and we think it was error to encourage the
jury to take into consideration the exercise of this right as "a circumstance in deciding upon the fairness of the transfer."
The other errors are not sustained.
Judgment reversed, and venirefacias de novo awarded.

